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Resumen
Fecha de Recepción: 30 de marzo del 2016 – Fecha de aprobación: 4 de Abril del 2016
Un nuevo acuerdo internacional sobre el cambio climático bajo el Marco de la Convención 
de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático se celebró en París en diciembre de 
2015. El Acuerdo de París (PA) afirma que las vías de emisión de gases de efecto invernadero 
(GEI) deben ser compatibles con mantener el aumento de la temperatura global por debajo 
de 1,5°C o 2°C por encima de los niveles pre-industriales. Nueva Zelanda (NZ) se ha 
comprometido a reducir las emisiones un 30% por debajo de los niveles de 2005 para el 
año 2030. El propósito de este trabajo es estimar los costos económicos de los términos PA 
cuando el potencial de mitigación se basa en la fijación de precios/no fijación de precios y 
la vinculación de las emisiones agrícolas/no la vinculación de las emisiones transables NZ 
Scheme (NZ ETS) a otros mercados de permisos de emisiones en Australia, la Unión Europea 
y los Estados Unidos. A través de un modelo de equilibrio general encontramos que Nueva 
Zelanda es capaz de cumplir con los términos PA; Sin embargo, el PIB se reduce en un 7% 
por debajo de la línea de base para el año 2030 debido a la rigurosidad de los objetivos. Si 
bien, la fijación de precios y la vinculación de la agricultura NZ ETS a otros mercados de 
emisiones, mitiga las pérdidas que vinculan a la Unión Europea ETS, puede no ser deseable 
debido a pérdidas significativas en la competitividad. Los resultados también muestran que 
la vinculación a Australia o los mercados de emisiones de Estados Unidos mitiga los costos 
de cumplimiento debido a los precios más bajos en los permisos de emisión.
Palabras Claves: Vinculación de mercado, emisiones agrícolas, equilibrio general
Abstract
A new international climate change agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change was concluded in Paris in December 2015. The Paris Agreement (PA) asserts 
that greenhouse gases (GHG) emission pathways should be consistent with holding the increase 
in global temperature below 1.5°C or 2°C above pre-industrial levels. New Zealand (NZ) has 
committed to reduce emissions to 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. The purpose of this paper is 
to estimate the economic costs from the PA terms when the mitigation potential relies on pricing/
not pricing agricultural emissions and linking/not linking the NZ Emissions Tradable Scheme (NZ 
ETS) to other markets of emissions permits in Australia, the European Union and the United States. 
Through a general equilibrium model we find that NZ is capable of meeting the PA terms; however, 
GDP decreases by 7% below the baseline by 2030 because of the stringency of the targets. Although, 
pricing agriculture and linking the NZ ETS to other emissions markets mitigates losses, linking to 
the European Union ETS, may not be desirable because of significant losses on competitiveness. 
Results also show that linking to Australia or the US emissions markets mitigates compliance costs 
because of lower prices on emissions permits.
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1.        Introduction
Negotiations towards a new international climate change agreement under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) concluded 
in Paris in December 2015. The Paris Agreement (PA) asserts that future greenhouse 
gases (GHG) emissions pathways should be consistent with holding the increase in 
the global average temperature below 1.5°C or 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The 
PA is due to enter into force by 2020 and seeks global emissions to peak as soon as 
possible and then to undertake rapid reductions thereafter (UNFCC 2015).
New Zealand (NZ) committed to reduce GHG emissions to 30% below 2005 
levels by 2030 (59.2 Mtons CO2e) and has also announced a target of reducing 
emissions to 50% of 1990 levels by 2050 (33.4 Mtons CO2e). Thus, meeting the 
reduction targets requires the implementation of mitigation policies, e.g., carbon 
markets, environmental taxes, and incentives to develop clean technologies. Those 
policies imply limits on emissions and, consequently, impacts on production systems 
and usage of GHG-intensive inputs across economic sectors. Furthermore, other 
countries, including NZ’s trade partners, also committed to reduce their own GHG 
emissions, which may imply changes in the trade flows and the competitiveness 
position of NZ. Thus, there is a multiplicity of effects that need to be considered to 
evaluate if NZ could cost-effectively meet its reduction targets. Hence, the purpose 
of this paper is to estimate the economic costs derived from the commitment under 
the PA when the mitigation potential relies on pricing/not pricing agricultural 
emissions and linking/not linking the NZ Emissions Tradable Scheme (NZ ETS) to 
international markets of emissions permits.
To estimate the economic impacts we use the Climate and Trade Dynamic 
General Equilibrium (CliMAT-DGE) model developed by Landcare Research, NZ. 
We first develop emissions pathways consistent with holding the increase in the global 
average temperature below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels. We simulate 8 scenarios 
where we allow pricing/not pricing agriculture emissions, and linking/not linking the 
NZ ETS to Australia (AUS), the European Union (EU), and the United States (US). 
We found that for 2030, NZ is capable of meeting the reduction targets in the PA terms; 
however, negative impacts occur on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and welfare. 
Impacts are mitigated if agriculture emissions are priced and if the NZ ETS is linked to 
Australia or the US emissions markets. Because of competitiveness effects, linking to 
the EU emissions market may not be advantageous compared to keeping the NZ ETS 
unlinked.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the modelling approach, 
section 3 presents the results, section 4 discusses our results in the light of previous 
research and current NZ political context, and section 5 concludes.
2.         Modelling Approach
In the following, we present the quantitative framework of our economic analysis. 
We first introduce the modelling approach and then the scenarios for simulation.
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2.1      Climate and Trade Dynamic General Equilibrium (CliMAT-DGE)
CliMAT-DGE is a multiregional, multi-sectoral, forward-looking dynamic 
general equilibrium model with a relatively long time horizon of 100 years or more 
(Fernandez and Daigneault 2015). This model is suited to studying the efficient (re)
allocation of resources within the economy and over time in response to resource or 
productivity shocks. CliMATDGE primarily uses the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) version 8 dataset. The base year of the benchmark projection is 2007. The 
model then develops a benchmark projection of the economic variables and GHG 
emissions, and simulates scenarios to evaluate the impacts of mitigation policies. 
Based on long-run conditions and constraints on physical resources, which restrict 
the opportunity set of agents, the model predicts the behaviour of the economy, 
energy use, and emissions by region and sector (Fæhn et al. 2013). CliMAT-DGE 
is coded using the Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium 
(MPSGE) package in GAMS (Rutherford 1999).
The sectors covered in this study are listed in Table 1. Coal, oil, gas, petroleum 
refining, renewable electricity and fossil electricity sectors are defined as separate 
sectors. Renewable and fossil electricity generation sectors are disaggregated from 
the single electricity GTAP sector. All production sectors are modelled using nested 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production functions, which capture the 
potential substitution between production technologies. The nesting structure in 
CliMAT-DGE partly follows Paltsev et al. (2005).
Table 1: CLIMAT-DGE Aggregated GTAP Production Sectors
Primary production sectors
Manufacturing and Value-added sectors
Secondary energy sectors
Grains including rice (GRA)
Other crops (CRO)
Oil seeds and sugar cane (OSC)
Plant based fibres (PFB)
Cattle, sheep and goats, horses (CTL)
Raw milk (RMK)
Forestry (FST)
Logs (LGS)
Coal (COA)
Oil
Gas
Petroleum, coal products (P_C)
Fossil electricity (EFS)
Carbon-free electricity (ECF)
Food products: meat products, dairy, oils, rice, sugar, beverages and tobacco (FOO)
Harvested wood products (HWP)
Energy-intensive manufacturing (EMT)
Non-energy-intensive manufacturing (NSV)
Transport (TPT)
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Model dynamics follow a forward-looking behaviour where decisions made 
today about production, consumption and investment are based on future expectations 
(Fernandez and Daigneault 2015). The economic agents have perfect foresight and 
know exactly what will happen in all future periods of the time horizon. Thus, 
households are able to smooth their consumption over time so that the savings 
rate varies endogenously. As expectations about the future affect current behaviour 
of agents, the forward-looking approach adds flexibility to adjust savings and 
consumption over time to partially mitigate the negative impacts of an environmental 
policy in the short run (Babiker et al. 2008; Dellink 2005).
The supply of labour in each region is undifferentiated by skill level and 
exogenously specified as part of the baseline scenario. We assume a full employment 
model closure, where a shock to the economy causes wages and rents to adjust until 
the fixed supply of each factor is again fully employed (Burfisher 2011). An exogenous 
growth of labour supply is assumed to reflect increases in the population and more 
efficient use of labour due to improving technology. Similarly, the supply of land and 
natural resources are assumed to be fixed in each period. Rents vary accordingly to 
keep full employment (Fernandez and Daigneault 2015).
The representative household chooses its path of consumption versus saving 
to maximize the discounted value of the utility attained from consumption in each 
period subject to an income constraint. This constraint implies that the present value 
of all future changes in a region’s current account balance must be zero. Any region 
may run a current account surplus or deficit in any period but (i) global savings must 
equal global investment and (ii) the present value of a region’s current and future 
surpluses must equal the present value of its current and future deficits (Fernandez 
and Daigneault 2015). International assets positions, financial stocks, and flows of 
financial assets are not explicitly modelled. Thus, while a current account deficit is 
financed by a capital account surplus, we cannot say anything about the composition 
of the capital account.
Carbon sequestration from forestry, and carbon capture and storage (as backstop 
technology) were both acceptable forms of GHG emissions reductions for all policy 
scenarios. For further technical details see Fernandez and Daigneault (2015).
2.2      Policy Scenarios
CliMAT-DGE develops a baseline scenario where the global economy is 
projected from the base year of 2007 to 2082 in the absence of mitigation policies for 
climate change. The impacts of the PA terms are analysed in terms of deviations (or 
percentage changes) of the variables of interest relative to the baseline.
To simulate the PA terms (GHG reduction targets), we imposed caps to 
the baseline emissions pathways so that they followed trajectories consistent with 
temperature increases of 2°C by 2100. Simulation scenarios are constructed around 
pricing/not pricing agricultural emissions, and linking/not linking the NZ ETS to other 
emissions markets (Australia, EU, US). The scenarios investigate the possibilities for 
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NZ to find cost-effective means to meet the reduction targets. The background of the 
scenarios relies on NZ being in a unique position as a developed country because of its 
unusual emissions profile. Agricultural non-carbon dioxide emissions (e.g. methane 
and nitrous dioxide) make up about half of New Zealand’s gross emissions, and a large 
share of electricity generation (80%) comes from renewable (carbon-free) sources 
(Ministry for the Environment 2015). Thus, severe limits may arise if mitigation 
relies only on input substitution and domestic abatement. Hence, NZ may need to 
affect agriculture emissions to meet its reduction targets (Kerr and Sweet 2008). On 
the other hand, linking to other emissions markets means that permits allocated in 
a domestic ETS can be used for compliance with policies in a non-domestic ETS 
(Gruell and Taschini 2012). Linking may be a cost-effective alternative to climate 
change mitigation (Alexeeva and Anger 2015; Babiker, Reilly, and Viguier 2004), 
compared with a fragmented approach, under which a number of regions would meet 
their emission reduction objectives in isolation ( Dellink et al. 2010).
3.        Simulation Results
This section presents the simulation results of the environmental, 
macroeconomic and competitiveness impacts of meeting the reduction target. We 
report the effects of the PA terms on emissions abatement, purchase of permits (Section 
3.1), the associated macroeconomic impacts (Section 3.2), and the competitiveness 
effects (Section 3.3). As a baseline we take as focal year 2030 where GDP reaches 
NZ$ 349.3 billion, aggregate consumption is NZ$ 15.12 billion, terms of trade are 
1.023, and greenhouse gas emissions are 94.4 MtCO2e.
3.1      Impacts on emissions market
The effects on domestic abatement and the import of permits are presented in 
Table 2. If agriculture emissions are priced, the permits price resulting from a non-
linked NZ ETS amounts to NZ$276 per ton of CO2e, and linking to the EU decreases 
the permit price to NZ$213 per ton of CO2e. This decrease implies that sectors in 
the EU exhibit high marginal abatement cost levels compared to NZ. Even more, 
linking to Australia or the US decreases the permit price to NZ$82 and NZ$60 per 
ton of CO2e, respectively, which signals the relatively lower abatement cost levels 
compared to NZ.
If agriculture is not priced and the NZ ETS remains unlinked, permits price 
reaches almost NZ$3,000 per ton of CO2e. Linking to the EU or Australia significantly 
decreases the price to NZ$249 and NZ$212 per ton of CO2e, respectively, and further 
linking to the US decreases the price to NZ$65 per ton of CO2e. These results show 
that even if a large sector, such as agriculture, is not priced, market linking adds 
flexibility for the priced sectors in order to meet the reduction targets. That is, even if 
the emissions permits market is constrained to non-agriculture sectors only, linking to 
the US alleviates pressure on priced sectors and partially offsets the stringency of the 
reduction targets.
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Table 2: Environmental impacts of alternative policy scenarios in 2030
Agriculture priced
Agriculture priced
Agriculture not priced
Permits price (in $NZ per ton of CO2e)
276
2914
34.90
0
12.33
22.32
29.41
5.41
9.00
26.18
34.90
0
13.71
20.70
15.73
19.09
8.90
26.29
82
212
213
249
60
65
Emissions abatement and import of permits (MtCo2e)
Domestic abatement
International permits
Domestic abatement
International permits
Agriculture 
priced
not
NZ ETS not 
linked
NZ   ETS
to AUS
NZ   ETS
to EU
linked linked NZ   ETS
to US
linked
The reduction target for NZ in 2030 is 34.9 MtCO2e.
Table 2 shows that NZ can meet this target; however, the mechanism differs 
across scenarios. If agriculture is priced, more than half of the mitigation effort comes 
from the import of permits when linked to Australia or the US, whereas mitigation 
from the import of permits from the EU is relatively low because of the higher permit 
price. In turn, if agriculture is not priced, import of permits from the EU should 
occur, despite the high price, because relying only on domestic abatement is more 
costly. Also, permits represent more than half of the mitigation effort if the NZ ETS 
is linked to AUS or US. Thus, results show that not pricing agriculture creates a 
highly constrained environment where NZ relies on a small number of sectors to meet 
reduction targets. However, as linking becomes available there is an offsetting effect 
because the permits prices are always lower than in any of the non-linking scenarios.
3.2        Macro economic impacts
From a general equilibrium perspective, the effects of climate change policies 
surpass those of the emissions market (Alexeeva and Anger 2015). The terms of the 
PA induce adjustments of production and consumption patterns towards less carbon 
intensity and associated energy use. The particular features to consider for NZ are that 
agricultural noncarbon dioxide emissions (e.g. methane and nitrous dioxide) make up 
about half of the country’s gross emissions, and a large share of electricity generation 
(80%) comes from renewable (carbon-free) sources (Ministry for the Environment 2015; 
Kerr and Sweet 2008). Thus, the interaction between pricing agricultural emissions and 
linking the NZ ETS to other markets leads to differential impacts on GDP and welfare.
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No linking
Agriculture priced -4.49
-7.3
0.98
-2.51
0.41
-4.98
1.04
-4.9
0.44
-0.85
-1.41
-2.77
-3.8
-2.93
-0.88
-0.48Agriculture 
priced
not
Agriculture priced
Agriculture 
priced
not
GDP Impact (% change with respect to baseline)
Social welfare impact (in % of Hicksian Equivalent variation)
AUS linking EU linking US linking
If agriculture is priced,
Table 2 shows that linking the NZ ETS to Australia or the US moderates the 
negative GDP impacts, whereas linking to the EU would lead to a 3.8% decrease below 
the baseline. That is, the EU may not be a good match for the NZ ETS because of the 
significantly different sizes of both economies, likely distortions in the permit trade 
(Doda and Taschini 2015), the EU’s own commitment to reduction targets, and high 
marginal abatement costs in the EU which lead to a high permits price. On the other 
hand, if agriculture is not priced and the NZ ETS remains unlinked, GDP decreases 
by 7.3% below the baseline. However, linking adds flexibility to non-primary sectors 
as the GDP impact is lower across all linking scenarios.
Table 2 also shows that if agriculture is priced, welfare increases for NZ across 
all linking scenarios. These increases result from the lower import prices for food 
commodities, increases in the domestic production of petroleum commodities, and 
the combined mitigating potential of pricing agricultural emissions and international 
linking of the NZ ETS. In turn, if agriculture is not priced, welfare decreases mainly 
because of losses in competitiveness in non-primary sectors.
Table 3: Macroeconomic impacts of alternative policy scenarios in 2030
3.3      Effects on international competitiveness
We evaluate economy-wide competitiveness effects, measured by changes in 
the terms of trade (ToT), and sectoral impacts through the Revealed Comparative 
Advantage (RCA) indicator. The RCA examines the export specialization pattern and 
compares the trade performance of an economic sector with the performance of all 
sectors within the region (Balassa 1965; Malmberg and Maskell 2007).
Table 4 shows that, if agriculture is priced, NZ faces ToT gains when the NZ 
ETS is unlinked or linked to the EU, whereas losses occur when the NZ ETS is linked 
to Australia or the US. In turn, if agriculture is not priced, all linking schemes lead to 
competitiveness losses, whereas gains occur if the NZ ETS remains unlinked. Hence, 
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although linking the NZ ETS mitigates the negative impacts on GDP, it does not 
necessarily improve national competitiveness. Moreover, although permits prices are 
much lower for any of the linking scenarios, relative to the no linking scenario, this 
does not fully offset the negative effects of the stringency of the reduction targets 
given the effects import and export activities, costs of domestic production, and 
consumption (Alexeeva and Anger 2015).
To decompose the national competitiveness effects at the sectoral level we 
use the RCA indicator. If agriculture is priced, linking the NZ ETS to the US market 
improves the competitiveness of NZ primary sectors. Improvements are motivated by 
the higher exports of cattle products and grains. In turn, losses in the competitiveness 
of primary sectors occur if is the NZ ETS is linked to Australia or, to a greater extent, 
the EU. The losses are motivated by greater imports of food products. Competitiveness 
of non-primary sectors improves if the NZ ETS remains unlinked or is linked to 
Australia or the EU. Improvements are due mainly to export increases of oil products. 
On the other hand, if agriculture is not priced, primary sectors gain competitiveness 
across all linking scenarios, and even if the NZ ETS remains unlinked.
Competitiveness effects depend on the exposure of a sector to the world market. 
Agriculture in NZ is highly exposed to the world market but it may be also outside the 
NZ ETS. The percentage changes of the RCA show that, even when agriculture is not 
priced, the primary sectors are more responsive than the non-primary sectors inside 
the NZ ETS. Thus, agriculture is indirectly affected by the reduction targets inside the 
NZ ETS as well (Klepper and Peterson 2004).
Furthermore, linking the NZ ETS to other markets leads to negative 
distortionary or ToT effects that may outweigh the efficiency gains from enabling 
international emissions trade. However, the competitiveness effects may not be a 
result only of linking but also of the stringency of the reduction targets. In fact, if 
agriculture is priced and the NZ ETS is linked to Australia or the US, there is indeed 
a mitigation of the negative effects of reaching the target reductions compared to an 
unlinked NZ ETS.
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Table 4: Competitiveness impacts of alternative policy scenarios in 2030
No linking AUS linking EU linking US linking
Agriculture priced 1.22
Terms of trade impacts (in % vs. Business as usual) for entire economy
Relative comparative advantage (in % vs. Business as usual) for primary sectors
Agriculture not priced 9.30
0.08
-0.81
0.25
-0.08
-2.43
-1.05
-10.01
3.03
13.05
-3.9
5.35
-1.6
2.62
-0.8
1.22
-0.4
-0.11
0.03
-7.76
2.35
-3.42
-1.77
Agriculture priced
Primary sectors
Non-primary sectors
Primary sectors
Non-primary sectors
Agriculture not priced
4.        Discussion
The PA terms for NZ are ambitious and not free of controversy. Prior work 
has documented that meeting reduction targets or INDCs requires policy measures 
and, consequently, responses from economic sectors. The purpose of this paper is to 
estimate the economic costs derived from the commitment under the PA when the 
mitigation potential relies on pricing/not pricing agricultural emissions and linking/
not linking the NZ ETS to international markets of emissions permits.
Prior research has focused on the effects on welfare and competitiveness of ETS 
linking, both from a global perspective and for the largest economies or contributors 
to GHG emissions. Alexeeva and Anger (2015) find that while EU Member States 
improve their terms of trade by integrating the EU ETS with other emerging ETS, non-
EU linking candidates face competitiveness losses. Lanzi et al. (2013) show that in 
the global climate mitigation scenarios presented in the OECD Environmental Outlook 
to 2050, macroeconomic and sectoral competitiveness impacts are the largest when 
ETS are not linked and the stringency of mitigation action varies substantially across 
countries. Linking can thus smooth distortions across the countries taking action on 
climate change (Jaffe and Stavins 2007). In this paper we found that linking the NZ ETS 
to Australia or the US mitigates the negative impacts of the PA terms and, if agriculture 
is priced, welfare increases for the representative household because of lower import 
prices for food products, and other increases in the domestic production of petroleum 
commodities. Furthermore, linking to Australia or the US may imply improvements in 
the competitiveness of primary sectors but detriment to nonprimary sectors.
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The economic impacts of linking are dependent on the modelling assumptions 
and the regional and institutional context. Anger (2008) shows that in the presence of 
parallel government trading under a post-Kyoto agreement, linking the EU ETS to 
Canada, Japan and the former Soviet Union, can reduce EU compliance costs by more 
than 60%. Anger, Brouns, and Onigkeit (2009) show that benefits of linking depend on 
the stringency of targets, which in turn affect abatement efforts and compliance costs. 
We found that linking the NZ ETS to Australia and the US decreases permits prices given 
the differential abatement costs across the regions. However, linking to the EU leads 
to complex competitiveness effects that may operate against the efficiency principle of 
creating a larger pool for permits. Our results agree with McKibbin, Shackleton, and 
Wilcoxen (1999) as we demonstrate how NZ may become subject to falling terms of 
trade after engaging in international emission trading with the EU. Hence, although 
the creation of a larger carbon market leads to more players and allowances, and 
thus to higher liquidity, it may not particularly benefit smaller countries such as NZ 
(Flachsland, Marschinski, and Edenhofer 2009a, b).
Pricing agricultural emissions has a significant role on the impacts of the PA 
terms. Agricultural emissions are a large pool to distribute the burden of mitigation 
efforts and may alleviate the stringency of reduction targets. Not pricing agriculture 
is welfare decreasing and when linking the NZ ETS, the primary gains from trading 
may be outweighed by pre-existing distortions and market imperfections such as 
distorted agricultural and energy markets in the EU (Babiker, Reilly, and Viguier 
2004). Furthermore, it is not known when NZ will set up its emissions profile after 
the PA comes into force. Although since January 2012, the agricultural sector has to 
report their emissions under the NZ ETS, currently there is no legislated date for when 
agricultural emissions will be priced under the ETS (Climate Change Information 
2012).
We show results for 2030 as focal date for the reduction targets set by NZ. 
An extensive analysis for 2050 would be desirable, but technological and other 
developments increase uncertainty around the results or the behaviour of the model 
over such a long time span. However, CliMAT-DGE failed to find a numerical solution 
for the scenarios where simultaneously no linking is available and agriculture is not 
priced. In other words, it was infeasible for NZ to meet the PA beyond 2030 if these 
two alternatives were not available.
5.        Conclusions
In this paper, we analysed the economic costs for NZ of meeting the PA 
terms. We introduced two issues that affect the likelihood of achieving the committed 
reduction targets, namely, pricing agricultural emissions and linking the NZ ETS to 
international permits markets. We found that linking the NZ ETS to Australia or the US 
is desirable given the relatively lower impacts on GDP. Linking to the EU instead leads 
to complex responses from the terms of trade, and competitiveness issues. Agricultural 
emissions play a significant role in meeting the PA, as they represent a large pool 
for emissions to distribute the burden of the mitigation effort. However, agricultural 
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exports are a large share of NZ total exports, creating a high degree of exposure to 
volatility of international permits markets. The gains from NZ ETS linking and pricing 
agriculture are important, but an open research path is whether and how those gains can 
be reaped in reality, given implementation, design and transaction costs.
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